Munitions Hole Pt. 1

Through the course of the wars from 2022-present, the US burned through significant stocks of its ballistic and cruise missile interceptors, as well as its higher end strike missiles. Starting with the expanded Operation Atlantic Resolve to assist Ukraine, the defense of Israel, Operations Prosperity Guardian and Rough Rider in the Red Sea and Yemen, and now the Third Gulf War, American interceptors and missile stocks were depleted to defend allies and partners, as well as strike targets in Yemen, Iraq, and Iran. This in turn has lead to a growing public concern about American stockpiles required to support the global forces deployed and to deter adversaries. However, it is important to look at what is already in process to address that shortfall. 

For the purpose of this exercise, I am focusing on what we could term higher end munitions, those that are the latest generations currently used by the armed forces of the United States. This helps narrow the focus on what we have expended and the need to catch up to Total Munitions Requirements. The systems I will look at are the PAC 3 MSE Patriot interceptor, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile, the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6), Tomahawk Cruise Missile, the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), and the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). These are all essential tools that the US relies on and would play a key role in any future large scale combat operations. These are the contracts from the period mentioned solely for domestic purchase of the selected munitions or toward increased production. It does not include Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts for specific countries, which do go towards maintaining the line, but are not illustrative for the purposes of what I am pointing to. 

Note: Contract awards are the total amount that the contractor can invoice the government for. The actual spend can be checked by looking up the contract numbers in USA Spending. 

PAC 3 MSE: Total $70,650,278,591

  • 4/23/2023: $2,451,432,304 (mod on an existing contract) 
  • 6/28/2024: $5,278,302,998 (new award, lists amount for Army and FMS sale but award spend lists only Army spend) 
  • 9/3/2025: $9,800,000,000 (signed with Army, no specific contract announcement) 
  • 4/9/2026: $4,761,000,000 (new award, lists amount for Army and FMS sale but award spend lists only Army spend) 
  • 7/30/2026: $53,859,843,289 (mod on an existing contract)
THAAD: Total $40,495,344,483
SM-3: Total $9,677,192,456
SM-6: Total $722,167,248
Tomahawk: Total $23,288,309,663

AMRAAM: Total $4,039,475,056
  • 8/30/2022: $567,411,124 (mod on existing contract, less amount for FMS)
  • 9/11/2024: $593,063,932 (mod on existing contract, less amount for FMS)
  • 7/31/2025: $2,879,000,000 (new award, less amount for FMS) 

JASSM: Total $5,985,686,380
PrSM: Total $13,339,535,048

As shown by the totals above, the United States has already made significant progress funding production of key munitions to backfill the stocks depleted by conflicts from 2022-now. Such significant investments in the munition lines should see increases in the annual production limits of key missiles required for defense planning. There are concerns regarding these investments that they lock the United States into legacy platforms for the near future, where more affordable precision guided missiles that allow for iterative designs to adapt to adversaries countermeasures are where the Department should be investing its dollars. There is an additional concern that such investments in the production lines will require ever larger portions of the service’s budgets to ensure they stay at the increased production level without industry closing them down due to reduced demand. These concerns will be explored in future posts (if I feel like it); however the key point to take away from the contract and announcements above are substantial investments into making up for the munitions shortfall that we have brought upon ourselves.  

It needs to be noted that even with the significant funding listed above, this is below what our estimated TMRs for a Pacific conflict would require. INDOPACOM has been warning that our stocks were insufficient in 2023-4, and that is before the substantial use of those platforms in the Third Gulf War. The money above was appropriated in the One Big Beautiful Act and the Appropriations Act for FY26. The money was intended to meet the requirements of 2025. We are well below that now, and these contracts will not meet the requirements that they were intended as the starting line has moved behind us. 

Comments

Post a Comment